

Kant and the Concept Containment

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Properties of Concept

Extension vs. Intension of Concepts

- **Intension** - internal content of a concept
- **Extension** - all those objects to which the concept applies.

Note of Concept

Note of a concept - concept, which is contained in another concept.

Notes of a concept - parts of the intension of a concept, which are necessarily predicated whenever the concept is predicated.

A concept F is contained in a concept G iff necessarily, every G is F

$$\bullet F \supset G = \boxed{?} \forall x (Gx \rightarrow Fx)$$

Gx

Fx

Note of Concept

Notes

Actual - explicitly thought in the intension of concept.

Virtual - not explicitly thought, but necessary connected with the actual notes.

Triangle

- a flat geometric formation having three angles
- such a formation that the axes of its sides intersect at a single point.

Note of Concept

Potential note - not a part of the intension, but it can be added without a contradiction.

Triangle - rectangular, chalked, equilateral.

Dog - collie, of my neighbor, with pedigree, etc.

Bolzano's Objections

1. The learned son of an unlearned father
2. The unlearned son of a learned father

Content - according to Bolzano is the same.

But -

1. learned, son of a unlearned father
2. unlearned, son of a learned father

Bolzano's Objections

1. a man who understands all European languages
2. a man who understands all living European languages

Bolzano - the content and the extension of 2. is greater

But -

1. a man who understands all living European languages

Bolzano's Objections

„Every idea of an object is a mere collection of the ideas of all the attributes this object necessarily has as an object of this idea.“

A) there are various constituents of an idea which do not express the attributes of the object that correspond to it

B) every object has attributes which, although it must have them in order to stand under a given idea, are nonetheless not thought as constituents of the idea.

Bolzano's Objections

A) there are various constituents of an idea which do not express the attributes of the object that correspond to it

- in order to form an idea of an object merely from ideas of the object's attributes $b, b, 'b, " \dots$ (insofar as this is possible), one also requires several further ideas, which serve to connect the former.
- But in this idea, in addition to the ideas of the attributes $b, b, 'b, " \dots$ there are other ideas, namely, the idea of something, the idea of the relative pronoun which, and the idea of having
- Thus the idea "equilateral", which expresses an attribute of an equilateral triangle, and indeed an idea contained in the concept of an equilateral triangle, is itself composed of the ideas "equality" and "side", which thus occur as (remote) parts in the concept of an equilateral triangle.

Bolzano's Objections

B) every object has attributes which, although it must have them in order to stand under a given idea, are nonetheless not thought as constituents of the idea.

- we ascribe an attribute to an object as one that necessarily follows from its concept, although we are not conscious in the slightest of having thought this attribute in the concept, or indeed of even having recognised it before
- There are undeniably ideas that we distinguish quite distinctly from one another while at the same time we see that they have the same objects and that the same attributes can be derived from each. The ideas of an equilateral triangle and of an equiangular triangle are of this kind

Bolzano's Objections

- There are ideas from which there follow not only a large but an actually infinite number of attributes of their objects. ...
Hence, in order to be able to say what we think by such an idea, we should have to think these ideas at least obscurely, hence simultaneously *think* an infinity of ideas with our finite understanding.